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In Iha Supreme Court of Iha Stale of Utah
PRICHARD TRANSFER, INC.,

Plaintiff,
- vs. W. S. HATCH CO., a Utah corporation;
PUBLI C SERVICE COMMISSION OF
1

Case No.
10761

U'TAH; DONALD HACKING, HAL S.
BENNETrr and DONALD T. ADAMS,
Commissioners of said Commission

'
Def end ants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal to this Court from orders of the
l'ublic St>rvice Commission of Utah, herein referred to
as the "Commission," in its Case 3918, Sub 12, wherein
it first denied the application of W. S. Hatch Company,
liPrein r<"ferred to as "Hatch," on July 12, 1966, and
thf·n on rc~hearing reversed itself on August 25, 1966
nml issued a certificate to transport sulphuric acid in
l1nlk from J\1Pxiean Hat to Moab, Utah.
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DISPOSITION OF MATTER BY COl\Il\IISSION
Plaintiff herein, Prichard Transfer, Inc., herein referred to as "Prichard," protestPd thl' application of
Hatch, as Prichard held proppr common carrier authority from tlw Commission to transport sulphuric acid
in bulk from Mexican Hat to .l\1oab, Utah, and \\'as
actively performing the very sPrvice which Hatch
sought. After the first hearing on April l, 19GG, it:-;
Order was issued July 12, 1%G, denying the Hatch application and finding that P1·ichard has the authority, the
c·quiprnent necessary and that "the evidence indicate:;;
that the services of Prichard in the transportation of
sulphuric acid am good." The Hatch Petition for Rehearing was granted and, without taking further evidence, the Commission entered its Order August 2;),
1966, reversing its prior Order of denial, and granted
to Hatch a Certificate to rwrforrn tlH' sanw sulphuric
acid haul then being performed by Prichard from M:t>xiean Hat to Moab. Prichard's Petition for Rehearing wa:-;
filed timely (September 13, 19nG), hut said petition was
denied October 10, 19G6. 11 he Petition for \Vrit of Review was filed in this court on Oetoher 28, l9G6.

RELlEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL
Prichard seeks to have this eourt reverse the Commission and find that the last Order in this proceeding-,
wherein its prior Order was

rt'VPl'SP<l

and wlwrPin a ('pr-
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tifirate was granted to Hatrh, is arbitrary and capri('ious, is not supported by the evidence and is contrary
to law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A sulphuric acid mill is operated at Mexican Hat,
Ftah, (San Juan County). Part of the acid is required at
the uranium mill in _Moab (Grand County). Prichard
holds authority from the Commission (Exhibit 5, R. 104)
to transport "acid in bulk in tank trucks" between Grand
and San J nan Counties, plus other countit>s not here
1wrtinent.
For the past two years it has been hauling acid
from the Mexican Hat plant to the uranium plant at
.'.\foab and to otht>r points.
Prichard has four acid tankers, (R. 106) over 25
diesc~l tractors (R. 105) and other equipment. It stations its equipment for this acid haul at its tenninal in
1\loab and maintains its office and shop at Price, Utah.
This carrier has had many years of service experience
in hauling acids and other commodities. It has served
the uranium mills since their inception. :Mr. Rex L .
.lones of Atlas :Minerals, a division of Atlas Corporation,
tliP shipper of the acid, testified that it had used Prichanl for hauling its acid to the Moab mill from its Mexican
I lat acid plant and had found the service to be "very
:-;at is fartory."
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Hatch has been hauling molten sulphur from the
railhead near Potash, Utah (18 milc>s from l\f oab) to
Mexican Hat. This is an interstate commerce movement, as the> sulphur originates by rail in Canada. Thus
the shipper uses Hatch as an interstate earrier to haul
the sulphur to its acid plant at l\lexican Hat and uses
Prichard to haul the acid to back to Moab for its uranium
mill. The shipper expects to increase its volume of shipments and expressed its opinion that it could obtain
a better rate from Hatch if it could not only haul the
sulphur to Mt>xiran Hat but also bring back the acid.
The evidence shows that the shipper estimated 1,000
tons of sulphur southbound and 1,500 tons of acid northbound. Upon these figures it t>stimated that Hatch could
publish lower rates on both commodities and save shipper
the difference between $159,720.00 per year at the present
rates and $91 ,200.00, to-wit $68,500.00 ( R. 43).
Hatch presented evidence that it would place m
service a different type tanker trailer unit which 1s
capable of hauling the molten sulphur south and the
acid north. Prichard testified that it would also procure such type equipment if required. As the ratio of
sulphur movements to acid movements is two to three,
one-third of all trips southbound must be empty, even
if the authority is granted (R +:~--t--t-).

Both carriers are experienced and capable of trans}JOrting the sulphuric acid. Prichard has the acid equipment and intrastate authoritv. and is performinO'
the
b
service. Hatch holds I.C.C. sulphur authority and is
hauling sulphur. Prichard does not have LC.C. sulphur
rights and Hatch does not have P.S.C.U. acid rights
from Mexican Hat to Moab. Each, in its own scope of
authority, is performing satisfactory service for the
shipper.
At the initial hearing in April 1966 the Commission
found that Prichard performs the acid service, stations
acid hauling equipment at Moab ''and evidence indicates
that the services of Prichard in the transportation of
sulphuric are good." (R. 108) Then it referred to the
desire of Atlas for reduction in transportation costs.
'•'rhis position has merit strictly on an economic and
rate basis, but does not constitute a showing of convenience and necessity or need for a new carrier." (R.
109) It then suggested that "Hatch and Prichard should

work together to reduce operating costs and thereby
iirovide for a reduction in rates on both the movement
of molten sulphur, Potash to 1\fexican Hat, and the movement of sulphuric acid, l\fexican Hat to Moab." Thereupon it denied the application of Hatch and ordered the
two carriers to "make and employ every legal means
of reducing operating costs and correspondingly reduce

thP rates" on the molten sulphur and the sulphuric acid.

6
A Petition for Rehearing was filed by Hatch (R.
1l2) and then the Commission set the matter for oral
argument on said petition (R. 114). Snch was done on
August 16th. No new evidence \Vas tendered or received.
On August 25 a new Report and Order was issued (R.
116-120) which vacated the earlier one and granted Hatch
an intrastate certificate to haul acid from :Mexican Hat
to Moeab. Once again it found that " ... Prichard provided satsifactory transportation on the north bound
movem0nt of sulphuric arid.... " (R. 118-119) and continued:
"vVe stated in our original order that the
case is more than in the nature of a rate case
than a certificate case and that while tlw showingmade by applicant \Vas meritorious it did not
constitute a showing of convenience and nece8sity.
As a general proposition we think this statement
is correct. However, the farts presented here
present a unique case in \vhich we think consideration of rates and the Pconomies proposPd is
proper. After hearing argument by both applicant and protestant on applicant's petition for
rehearing and reconsideration, and after hearing
additional evidence adduced by both parties, WP
find that applicant has sustained its burden of
proving convenience and necessit~r in this particular instance, and that a grant of the application
will afford the shipper a eornhination transportation service at ratf's to whieh it is t~ntitl<>d." (R
118-119)
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Prichard then filed its Petition for Rehearing (R.
122-123), but such was denied bv
. Order on October 10'
1966 ( R. 124), and thereafter this appeal was taken.
Prichard's evidence demonstrates that the diversion
of this sulphuric acid haul vrill require it to close down
its l\J oab terminal and will adversely affect its opera.
tions.
Applicant testified that it would duplicate Prichard's operations, as it would station equipment at Moab
(R. 17), where Prichard has its tank equipment stationed. Hatch says its present operations are not efficient on hauling molten sulphur, as it is a one-day haul
and they are using a converted insulated asphalt type
semi-trailer. A new unit would be required for it to
perform the two-way haul of sulphur and of acid.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS PROVE ADEQUATE AND SATISFACTORY SERVICE BY PRICHARD ON ALL ACID
MOVEMENTS AND ITS ABILITY TO CONTINUE
PERFORMANCE FOR SHIPPER.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN BASING AN INTRASTATE CERTIFICATE GRANT ON POSSIBLE BUT
UNPROVEN RATE SAVINGS ON A COMBINATION
INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE MOVEMENT.
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POINT III
MERE

PROSPECTIVE

SAVIN GS

FROM

JOINT

INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE RATE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY APPLICANT

ARE

NOT

PROPER BASES FOR GRANT OF AUTHORITY
WHERE NO INADEQUACY OF EXISTING AUTHORIZED SERVICE HAS BEEN SHOWN.
POINT IV
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
THAT THE PROSPECTIVE REDUCTION OF INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE RATES IS A BASIS
FOR PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
UNDER THE UT AH STATUTE.

The requisite procedural steps for this appeal have
been taken and there is a clear issue before this court
which boils down to this proposition:
In the face of existing satisfactory service
by Prichard on the intrastate acid haul, may the
Commission grant authority to Hatch to perform
that very service solely to enable shipper to obtain lower rates on a combination interstate and
intrastate movement (interstate molten sulphur
southbound and intrastate sulphuric acid northbound)~

9

The answer to this prnlil<·rn is furOwr complicated
11,· tliP aprilicant's faihHP to Ill'<'s<>nt to th<> Commission
any Pxhihits n•flpdinp: its suppmwd iww and lower rnt<•s
<;Jl PithPr thP infrrstatP or tlw intrastatP S<'µ,'lll<'nh; of tlw
('Olllhination Operations. :\o alJpli('ation for n•dncP<l
rnh·s \\·a:-: ])(>fm·<· 1!w Commission at the tirnP of tlw
ll<'aring. Tlw onl,'I· shipper witness, ~fr.•Jones, was
askPd ahont rates and proper objPetions WPre made
(H. :)7) on tlw basis that applicant had not proposed a
rah• change on Pither the intrastate haul over which
tltP Co111mission has jurisdiction, nor thP intl>rstate tari ff"s \\'hich al'<' controlh·d hy the I.C.C. ThesP objections
\\-Pl'P o\·errnlf'd and i\f r. .Tones th('n testified as to the
pr<•sPnt rates on molten sulphur and on acid. He further
was JH'nnitt<>d to us<> an assumed rate based upon a
1wo-\\'ay haul to proch1ce the puqrnrted $fi8,500.00 saving.
ll<• said that if h<• <·onlCTn't get that saving he would
llllt on his 0\\11 trn<'k.
l\l r .•Tones tlwn askt•d wlwther or not he was "supporting this application on the assumption that lower
ratPs would bP available to you. That is right; we have
found the st>rvi<·<• of hoth Prichard and Hatch very satisfodor~· to tlw rompan~· .... " (R. -1-:1)
(<~wn

after this state of the record, Hatch failed

Jll'PsPnt evidPTI<'<' as to its proposed n~clucPd rates 1111wli 1·l1:111g<'

wlwn -

what <'hange in interstatP -

in intrastatP

~-

etc.

to

how
what
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The statute, Section 54-6-5 UCA 1953 relating to
certification of common carriPrs requirPs first a finding:
"from the evidence that public convenience and necessity
require the proposed service. . . . " and then requires
that it "take into consideration ... the existing transportation facilities in the territory sought to be served.
If the commission finds . . . that the granting of the
certificate applied for will be detrirnrntal to the best
interests of the people of the state of Utah, the Commission shall not grant such certificate."
Hatch seeks to obtain Prichard's acid haul by proposing a lower rate. Consider that statute in light of
the specific finding that Prichard's services "in the
transportation of sulphuric acid are good." (R. 133)
Also, consider the case law wherein this Court has on
past similar issues interpreted the statute.
We should keep in mind the initial "Report and
Order Denying Application" (R. 107-110), in which the
Commission specifically considered the only evidence
before it, reviewed the suggested economies and then
found that Hatch's position "has merit strictly on an
economic and rate basis, but does not constitute a showing of convenience and necessity or need for a new
. "
carrier.
This was a rate case, with Hatch being unwilling to
disclose its proposed nPw rates. ri1hP Commission could
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not grant a certificate to a new carrier solely because
it was suggested that the new carrier would "chisel"
rates to get the business. The "n•hearing" was merelv
an "Oral Argument on Petition for Rehearing." (R. 114)
The new Report and OrdPr (R. 116-120) largely reiterates the fonner findings which spell out the shipper's
desire for lower rates which it believes will result. It
then pursues the folJowing approach: "Pursuant to the
Commission's order both Hatch and Prichard did
attempt to work out some joint arrangement whereby
these economies could be effected.
"The carriPrs reported that they had attempted in
good faith to ·work out a joint arrangement but had been
unsuccessful in that attempt. The Commission's Order
of July 12 was by its very nature a conditional order,
basPd in part upon the ability of the carriers to effect
the economies in a joint operation. "\Vhile the applicant
IJatch provides satisfactory service on the southbound
transportation of molten sulphur and the protestant
Prichard provides satisfactory transportation on the
northbound movement of sulphuric acid, there is no existing service available which can be performed by one
carrier in the same vehicle which is necessary to effect
the economies herein mentioned.
"We stated in our original order that the case is
more in the nature of a rate case than a certificate case
mid that while the showing made by applicant was meri-
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torious it did not constitntP a showing of conveniencP
and necessity. As a general proposition WP think thi:,,
statement is coIT<>ct. H<nveY<'r, the facts 1uesented herp
present a unique case in '''hieh we think e.onsideration
of rates and economies proposed is proper. After hearing arg11111ent by both applicant and protestant on applicant's petition for rehearing and reeonsideration, and
after hearing additional evidence adduced by both
parties, \Ve find that applicant has sustained it.s lmrdPn
of proving convenienee and npcessit_,, in this pnrtienlar
instance, and that a gTant of tlw applieaton will afford
the shipper a eombination transportation service at rate~.
to which it is entitled."
POINT V
THE COMMISSION ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN REVERSING ITS
ORDER OF JULY 12, 1966 WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE AND IN GRANTING A CERTIFICATE TO
HATCH.
POINT VI
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS FINDING IN
THE SECOND ORDER OF "HEARING ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY BOTH PARTIES," AS
ONLY ARGUMENTS WERE HEARD ON AUGUST
16, 1966.
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POINT VII
THE ORDER OF AUGUST 25, 1966 IS CONTRARY
TO LAW AND IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS.

Thf' Commission has been faced with a desire to
help out a shipper on the one hand, and a complete failure
of the applicant to prove public convenience and necessity on the other hand. Its first Report and Order
recognized this and properly denied the application. In
an effort to be helpful, the Commission suggested that
the applicant and protestant attempt to work out "every
legal means of reducing operating costs and correspondingly reduce the rates on the transporatation .... " Even
the applicant, Hatch, thought this was wrong; see its
petition for rehearing. (R. 112)
The Commission then gave "Notice of Oral Argument'' on the said petition. At this time no reporter
was required, as only oral argument was contemplated.
A round-table type discussion was had, at which it be~
came evident that Hatch made it clear (as shown by
its petition for rehearing) that it had no duty to lease
its equipment to Prichard for the intrastate phase of the
haul, though it admitted that it leased extra acid tank
units from Prichard for some of its interstate operations.
\Ve submit that the intransegent position of this large
carrier presented a dilemma to the Commission which it
sought to solve by surrendering to Hatch and taking
awa~' Prichard's c:•stahlished acid haul.
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Only one shipper appeared - only money savings
by combining the interstate and intrastate movements
in one carrier were at issue - how can this be considered
proof of "public convenience and necessity"'? The Commission had no jurisdiction over the interstate phase,
either as to the authority or the rates, so it abdicated
to the insistance of Hatch that the shipper might put on
its O\Vll truck if the cheaper rates were not published
by Hatch. In order to cut the rates, Hatch would have
to take Prichard's acid haul away from it.
rrhe record reflects that past operations have been
on a rather modest basis, hut the shipper now contemplates an increase in its sulphuric acid manufacturing
and use. vVhen it was tendering only a few loads per
week, shipper was content to use the two carriers whose
services is described as being "vpry satisfactory". Now
it will have greater volume of movements, Atlas is demanding that only one carrier Rerve it and that the
rates he draRtically cut.
Historically, Prichard has held acid authority in
bulk since the inception of the uranium boom. When the
rail line was extended from Thompson to the Potash
mine and molten sulphur was made available in tank
cars there, Hatch sought and obtained interstate rights
to haul such to Mexican Hat. Some virtue is claimed
by Hatch in that it says that it proposed that it would
not have opposed a similar application hy Prichard for
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like interstate sulphur rights at that time if Prichard
"·ould agree not to oppose Hatrh's application for intrastate rights on the sulphuric acid from Mexican Hat
to Moab (R. 63). The net result of this play by Hatch
would have he·en that this large carrier ($2,936,849.00
1965 revenue, R. 103) would be able to undercut Prichard
and have the complete service to itself. When Prichard
refused to surrender by acquiescing in this deal, Hatch
has proceeded with the present application.
Prichard testified as to its willingness to reduce
its rates as and when the shipper increases its volume,
hut such additional number of shipments have not been
lPndered to it. Of course, this Commission has jurisdicti on over intrastate rates and Prichard's present rates

are approved by it.
The new Report and Order giving Hatch its

pro~

posed certificate was made by the Commission, reversing its conclusions. Though it refers to a "further hearing" (R. 116) and "additional evidence'' (R. 119) we
have no record to sustain this. As indicated above, oral
arguments were scheduled and in fact the parties, their
counsel and the Commission had a sort of a "round table"
discussion. Prichard was anxious to continue its service.
No arrangements could be worked out with Hatch on
Pquipment leases as the southbound sulphur was interf'tatP and the acid µ:oing north was intrastate.
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Section 54-7-15 U.C.A. 1953 relates to Rehearings.
It provides in part that the "Commission may grant and
hold such rehearing on such matters. . . ." What does
"rehearing'' mean~ It must relate to the same type
proceeding as was contemplated initially on an application for an intrastate certificate which is designated
in Section 54-6-5 as a "hearing," which contemplates
proper notice and the takjng of evidence. A rehearing·
must be a review of the portions of the case through
new evidence.
Thereafter Section 54-7-15 (supra) provides:
"If, after such rehearing and consideration
of all of the facts including those arising since
the making of the order or decision, the commission shall be of the opinion that the original
order or decision or any part thereof is in any
respect unjust and unwarranfod or should be
changed, the commission may abrogate, change or
modify the same. Such order or decision shall
have the same force and effect as an original
order or decision, but shall not affect any right
or the enforcement of any right arising from
or by virtue of the original order or decision
unless so ordered by the commission."
No additional shipper evidence was taken at tlw
purported "rehearing," which was noticed as an "oral
argument." So in fact no rehearing was ever grantP<l.
ri'his Court has imposed upon it the duty to revie1\' on
certlorari in this proceeding the issue of ''whPther tlw
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Commission has regularly pursued its authority. . . . "
\Ve submit that the Commission had no right to reverse
its prior findings of fact as to adequacy of service hy
Prichard without further evidence and merely to accommodate a shipper's desire for lower rates. Further, the
ultimate conclusion in the form of a finding in the new
order (R 113) ... "that a grant of the application will
afford the shipper a combination transportation service
at rates to which it is entitled," is without any supporting evidence. The record contains absolutely no proof
of a rate tender by applicant. "\Vhy is this one shipper
"Pntitled" to such preferential rate treatment as to require the existing carrier, Prichard, whose rates have
heen duly approved hy the Commission, to be deprived
of its well established and needed acid haul 1

It is not unusual for a shipper to support an application of a new carrier in an effort to get lower rates.
Traditionally the Commission has turned a deaf ear to
such a plea and has followed the statutes in ascertaining
the adequacy of existing transportation services. In this
case the Commission seems to have been over persuaded
to favor the Hatch application to accommodate a single
shipper.
vVe are mindful of the review proVJsrnns of the
statute that: The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall be final and shall
not h0 suhject to n~vif>w. Such questions of fact shall
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include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions
of the Commission on reasonableness and discrimination.
(Section 54- 7-16 TT.C.A. 1953). The conclusions on
"reasonableness and discrimination" relate to rate mattaers; thus the only real sanctity of the Co1mnission 's
findings must be on "ultimate facts.'' The ultimate facts
supported by evidence and found in this case are:
(a) Prichard has proper authority to perform the acid haul;
(b) Prichard 's serVJce and equipment are
satisfactory; and
(c) 'The shipper hopes for reduced rates if
one carrier has both interstate sulphur authority
and intrastate acid authority.
The conclusion, that this constitutes proof of public
convenience and necessity sufficient to take the business
away from Prichard and hand it over to Hatch, is not
given any sanctity by the statute. This is contrary to
law; it violates prior administrative interpretations of
the statute and is arbitrary and capricious.
Many cases hold that this Court on review will not
disturb the Commission's order if tlwre is any "sub~
stantial" or "competent" evidencP to support it.
The purpose of the revie1v by the Court is to determine whetlwr the Commission ha:,; aetPd ontsidP of its
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jurisdiction or in a manner which would properly be
n•garded as capricious, arhitrar~· or wholly unreasonable
in view of the record hefore it, Lakr Shore Motor Coach
Li11es v. Wclli11g, 9 Utah 2d 11-1-; 3:39 P. 2d 1011. In that
same case this court also said that; "the revenue provided for has a d0finite and useful purpose and that the
duty and prerogative of the court are something more
than a mere perfunctory rubber stamping of the actions
of the Commission."

We have the problem before this court now of det0rmining whether the prospective savings in shipping
costs for a single shipper constitutes the type evidence
n'quired by the statutt• and prior cases to prove conVl'nience and necessity. \Ve call to the court's attention
the following quotation from Ashworth Transfer Co. v.
PulJlic Service Commission of Utah, 2 Utah 2d 23; 268
P. 2d 990, at 99:5:
"The 'convenience' and 'necessity' to be considered is that of the public, Mulcahy v. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d.
209, and the statute does not require that the
Commission find that the present facilities are
entirely inadPquate. It merely requires that the
Commission 'shall take into consideration ... the
Pxisting transportation facilities'; it is obvious
from the language of the order granting the
application and the order denying the petition
for rdwaring, as well as the evidence, that the
Commission did take these matters into considerattion. ''
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In a matter involving a request by carrier for a
specialized service for a limited number of shippers
(flour, sugar, powdered milk and salt for Pelton Spudnut, Inc. and two other shippers) the court vacated the
order of the Commission, granted a certificate and said
this:

"It is well settled that this court cannot sub-

stitute its judgment for that of the Commission
and its findings will not he disturbed wlwn thev
are supported by competent evidence.
·

"The Commission must take into account the
long-range plans for the protection of existing
carriers, as well as the irmnediate convenience of
certain members of the public. Common carriers
which are expected to maintain regular servief>
for the movement of freight in whatever quantities offered to and from all points on specified
routes cannot operate economically and efficiently
if other carriers are permitted to invade sueh
routes for the sole purpose of handling special
commodities on an irregular route basis." (Milne
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission
of Utah, 11 Utah 2d 365; 339 P. 2d 909, at 910)

It appears abvious that there was no proof of public
convenience and necessity sufficient to sustain a grant
of a certificate in this case, when only one shipper
appeared, on only one commodity, and acknowle<lged adequacy of the existing service by supporting the application in hopes of a reduced combination tariff for intra
state and interstate rnovenwntR.
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POINT VIII
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING PRICHARD'S PETITION FOR REHEARING.
POINT IX
THE

GRANTING

OF

THE

CERTIFICATE

TO

HATCH WILL RESULT IN A WRONGFUL DIVERSION OF TRAFFIC FROM PRICHARD, WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT ITS ABILITY TO SERVE THE
AREA AND IS DERIMENT AL TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
UTAH.

After the oral argument and the new order of the
Commission completely reversing its prior position,
Prichard filed its petition for rehearing in this matter,
pointing out the inadequacy of the evidence, the fallacy
of taking away the service from an established carrier
merely on a reduced rate promise of the applicant and
the adverse effects which such would have upon the
nhility of Prichard to continue its service. This was
<lenied without oral argument but summarily by the
Commission. Tht>re seems to be no finding by the Commission at any point as to the adverse effect of the
grant of this authority to Hatch, though such is one
of the matters which the Commission should consider
and tfotermint>. The evidt>nee shows that Prichard's pri-

rnary place of lmsin<>ss is at PricP, Ftah, hut that it haf.:
stationed <•quiprnt>nt at M oah and that the taking a\ra\·
of the only regular serviee \\'hieh it has from its l\f oab
dispatch point, nanwl.v tlw aeid Jiau! from ~lexiean Hat
to .Moab, will eliminate an:· Pconmnic basis for continuing the stationing of equipnwnt at l\Ioah. Thus this
community \\-ill have On<.' lPss motor cani<•r s<•rvi<'P available, one less group of Prnplo:·eps in its eeon0111:·, and
that in part is proof of the detrimental c-ffrct upon the
economy. The volume of lmsiness is not sufficient to
sustain bx.·o earriers in transporting acid from tlw 1>lant
at l\Texican Hat to the uranium plant at 1\1oah, but thr
pffpd of thiR order will he to leavi> Prichard with the
anthorit:r for all of 8an .Tuan and Grand CountieR and
leave it with the obligation to serve the oecasional mow11wnts from Mexican Hat to small uranium mines in thr
counties without the sustaining stn•ngth of the regular
movPrnPnt of aeid to tlH' nraniu111 plant at l\f oah.

lt was made very clear that Prichard would do all
in its power to reduce its rates, with the approval of
the Commission, if tlw additional volnnw of shipm0nt:-:
were tendPred to it for shipmr·nt. Ruch volume rnovrments wen~ the basis for the computation of anticipated
savings by th<> ship1wr, should Hakh haw tlw two-way
lllOVPmPnt.
\Ve know that this eonrt ha:-; had lH'forP it ~ttl'fici<·nl
rnattPrn from tl1P Puhli<' N'•rvic<• Co111n1i~~io11 to n·<·oµ;-
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nrne that, with rare exceptions, most transportation on
helialf of a shipper is a one-way movement, and that the
rates of carriers are established upon that basis. Whether
it is the movement of asphalt from a refinpry to a road
construction job, the transr)()rtation of beams or lumber
to a construction sitP, the movPment of flour, salt or
sngar to a bakery or canning establishmPnt, or the trans1iortation of household goods to a new residential locat;on, no hackhaul is rxpected h.\· the carrier and none
i::: available. I1~vPn the regular ronte motor common
carriPrs rarely haw a halancPd operation whereby they
<'an develop enough traffie originating at a point such
as l\f oah or Kanab eoming back to the \Vasatch front
to match the forward movemPnt of traffic from the Wasatch front area to thPse outlying points. Thus the
gratuitous declaration hy the Commission in its second
report and ordPr, that the removal of the transportation
from Prichard and the granting to Hatch will afford the
sliiv1wrs "combination transportation service at rates
to which it is Pntitled" is pure fiction. No shipper,
whether its nanw is Atlas or otherwise, is entitled to
1-;1weial rat(•s on a combination interstat!:' or intrastate
~-shipment,

and no shipper is !:'ntitled to special rates

Pn dissimilar com1110diti(•s, !:'Ven where both movements

an• in intrastate conmwrce. The fact that the tonnage of
aeid moving north to the uranium plant is substantially
gr<·atPr than movPnient of sulphur from the railhead
!!11ing south h.\' it:-;plf negativt•s the premise that the
: 11

i pprq· is "entitled''' to a special rate.
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CONCLUSION
Prichard respPctfully snhmits to tlw court that thi:s
case requires th(~ reversal of th<' Public Sf'rvice Commission of Utah, and the original rqwrt and order of
the Commission denying- tht> application of Hatch should
he affirm<~d and the new order reversed. Th0 fallacious
premise of giving a hig shipper some savings at the expens~~ and destruction of a small motor carrier whosP
rates are regulated by the Commission d()('S not sustain
an award of a certificate of convenienc0 arnl neeessity.
RPspectfull~1

submitted,

HARRY D.

PPGRLI1~Y

Attorney for Plaintiff
Prichard Transf Pr, lnr.
600 El Paso Gas Building
Ralt LakP City, Utah

